
TERMS OF PEACE PROPOSED BY THE GREAT POWERS.

FOR the third time, in little more than half a century, a sovereign of France finds himself in the custody of the international police. For the third time, within the memory of many now living, France has been compelled to expiate her lust for military glory by kissing the rod of a conqueror, and each time it was a Bonaparte who subjected her to this humiliation. "If a man betrays me once," says an old proverb, "it is my misfortune; if twice, it is my fault." In allowing herself to be not twice, but thrice betrayed, and brought to the verge of ruin by Cæsarism, France must be assumed to share largely in its criminality, and therefore can hardly complain that she shares in its expiation. If she could be thus led astray three times, why not four, and what security shall now be taken by Europe against this national infirmity of their gifted and fascinating, but most disorderly neighbor?

This is the great question which the Germanic and Gallic races have been debating with the sword for the past five months, and no European question was ever debated with a greater display of military genius and resource. At what conclusions they will, or ought to arrive, we shall not presume to express any opinion. The terms of peace that should close such a war involve many considerations with which the mass of our readers are not familiar, and to many of which they are generally indifferent.

As Germany was alone attacked, and has alone repelled her assailants with an unparalleled succession of victories, she is entitled

to settle the conditions upon which she will withdraw her victorious armies from the soil of France. Those conditions, however, must necessarily affect the other European States more or less nearly, and it is generally assumed that they will expect to be heard in the final adjustment. In anticipation of such a contingency, we propose to lay before our readers the latest formal expression of opinion by the Great Powers of Europe upon all the questions now at issue between the two belligerents. Europe is a republic of nations, so bound together by a community of interests, jealousies, and traditions, that no State is likely to settle any European question, even if it possess the power to do so, without deferring respectfully to the unanimous opinion of her sister States.

Early in the year 1805, and while the first Napoleon was planning his invasion of England from Boulogne, England and Russia organized a European Alliance, designed, first, "To rescue from the close dominion of France those countries which it has subjugated since the revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood before that time; second, To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recovered from France as may provide for their security and happiness, and may, at the same time, constitute a more effectual barrier in future against encroachments on the part of France," etc.

This Alliance, after years of desolating war, resulted in the defeat of Napoleon, and his abdication at Fontainebleau on the 11th April, 1814. By the treaty of abdication which he

signed, the Emperor renounced for himself, his successors, and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all rights of sovereignty and dominion as well to the French empire and the kingdom of Italy, as over every other country. He and the Empress were permitted to retain their titles and rank for life; his mother, brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, to retain also, wherever they might reside, the titles of princes of his family.

The Island of Elba was assigned to the Emperor as a place of residence, to form during his life a separate principality, to be possessed by him in full sovereignty and property, besides which he was to have an annual revenue from France of 2,000,000 francs, 1,000,000 of which were to be in reversion for the Empress.

The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla were given to the Empress Maria Louisa in full sovereignty, with the right of descent to her son and his descendants, the Prince thenceforth to take the title of Prince of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla.

A further rent-charge upon France of 2,500,000 francs was imposed for the use of the Princes and Princesses of Napoleon's family, to be divided among them, so that the revenue of each was to be in the following proportions:—

	France.
To Madame Mother.....	300,000
To King Joseph and his Queen.....	500,000
To King Louis.....	200,000
To the Queen Hortense and to her children.....	400,000
To King Jerome and his Queen.....	500,000
To the Princess Eliza.....	300,000
To the Princess Paulina.....	300,000
Total.....	2,500,000

The Princes and Princesses were also allowed to retain all their property, whether real or personal, and the *rentes* which stood in their name in France. An annual pension of 1,000,000 francs was allowed to Josephine, and the full enjoyment of all her private property secured to her. For her son, Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, a suitable establishment out of France was to be provided.

Of funds in France, standing in the Emperor's name, 2,000,000 francs were to be set

apart to be spent in gratifications to persons whose names should be found upon a list to be furnished by him. The debts of his household were to be immediately paid out of the public treasury, and passports and passage to the Emperor, Empress, and all the Imperial family, with their equipages, etc., and necessary escort, were to be furnished by and at the expense of the Allies.

For the Emperor, a detachment of from 1,200 to 1,500 of the Imperial Guard were detailed as an escort, and 400 volunteers, officers and soldiers, whom he was allowed to take with him to St. Tropez, the place of his embarkation, where he was to find a corvette which was to become his property, and the necessary transports to carry him and his household to their place of destination.

This treaty, so magnanimous towards the Emperor's family, also provided that France should be reduced to her original proportions before 1792.

This last provision deprived the Empire and dependencies of over 30,000,000 of inhabitants.

The treaty was signed on the part of the Allies by Metternich for Austria, Nesselrode for Russia, and Hardenburg for Prussia. England did not sign at first, but acceded to it a few days later, "as far as respects the stipulations relative to the possession of the sovereignty of the island of Elba, and also in the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla; but the Prince Regent was unwilling to be a party to any of the other provisions or stipulations."

Castlereagh, who represented England on this occasion at Fontainebleau, writing to his Government an account of his accession to the treaty, said: "My objections to being mixed up in its forms, especially in the recognition of Napoleon's title under present circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable. At my suggestion," he adds, "the recognition of the Imperial titles in the family were limited to their respective lives. . . . To the arrangement in favor of the Empress I felt not only no objection, but considered it due to the distinguished sacrifice of domestic feelings which the Emperor of Austria was making to the cause of Europe. I should

have wished to substitute another position in lieu of Elba for Napoleon's retirement; but none having the quality of security, on which he insisted, seemed disposable, to which equal objections did not occur; and I did not feel that I could encourage the alternative which M. de Coulaingcourt assured me Bonaparte repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England."

Liberal as were the terms of this treaty to Napoleon, all the world knows how far they fell short of contenting his insane ambition; how soon he broke all the pledges he so solemnly gave and accepted at Fontainebleau; how he forced the Allied Powers to a new coalition against him as the common enemy of mankind; how he was abetted in his lawless infidelity by the army of France; and how, at Waterloo, just fourteen months and seven days from that time, he found himself again disarmed and a captive at the mercy of the Allies.

The Congress at Vienna was still in session when Napoleon landed from Elba, on the 1st of March, 1815. On the 13th of that month they united in proclaiming him an outlaw. "By thus violating the convention which had established him in the island of Elba," they said, "Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

"The powers, consequently, declare that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as an enemy and a disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance."

The Allies, after their triumph at Waterloo, finding they had to deal with a man whom no engagements could bind, nor moral considerations restrain; who had infected the French nation, to a serious extent, with the virus of his own disorderly nature, proceeded to take the measures they deemed necessary to prevent Europe from being again disturbed by the wickedness of the one or the delusions of the other. In regard to Bonaparte, a

treaty was signed by the Allies, by which they agreed upon the measures most proper to render all undertakings on his part against the repose of Europe impossible. By this treaty, Bonaparte is declared "the prisoner of the Allies; his custody is specially intrusted to the British Government. The choice of the place, and of the measures which can best secure the objects of the present stipulation, are reserved to his Britannic Majesty."

Article 3d provided that the other Allies were to send commissioners to whatever place the King of England might select for their prisoner's residence, "who, without being responsible for his custody, will assure themselves of his presence." The King of France was invited to do the same.

It is familiar to all the world that the King of England selected for the future residence of the captive Emperor one of the most remote and desolate islands in the Eastern seas, where the man who, in his prosperity, had found the world too circumscribed for his ambition, met adversity with less dignity and courage than might be expected from the humblest peasant; where he eked out his days in trying to corrupt the sources of history, and where his remains reposed until, in an evil hour, the Government of France, yielding to the fatal passion which he had so fearfully stimulated for military glory, condoned his offences against France, against liberty, against humanity, and ordered his ashes to be brought back to Paris with great pomp, as a pious and patriotic duty.

As Solomon's wives, in his old age, turned away his heart after other gods, and provoked the dissolution of his kingdom, so did this weakness of Louis Philippe's government revive the Cæsarian worship in France, and lay the foundations of the new Empire, with its terrible retributions. Nor were the allied sovereigns entirely innocent of these results. Talleyrand, who knew Napoleon better probably than any other Frenchman, told them, the day after they entered Paris in 1815, when they met at his hotel to consider what they were to do next, that there could be no peace in Europe while Napoleon or any of his dynasty were on the throne. Indeed, the Allies

proceeded at that time on this presumption, for, by their definitive treaties of peace, they particularly and emphatically confirmed the stipulations of the treaty signed the previous year, by which Napoleon was to have been forever excluded from supreme power in France, which exclusion the contracting powers bound themselves to maintain in full vigor, and, should it be necessary, with the whole of their forces.

The monarch who pandered to the *chauvinism* of his people by bringing back the remains of Bonaparte from St. Helena; England, who could, but did not, withhold her assent to it; and the Allies who, in 1849, did not enforce the clause of their treaty against the Bonaparte family, have all—some in one way and some in another—bitterly expiated their indiscreet complaisance.

The Allies, however, in 1815, were far from being contented with putting Bonaparte out of the way; for they knew that the predatory tastes he had nourished—if not inspired—remained behind him. By a series of treaties framed to secure to the Allies "proper indemnities for the past and solid guarantees for the future," and signed on the 20th of November, 1815, it was provided: *First*, That France should pay the Allies an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, in daily installments, within five years, without interest. *Second*, Eighteen of the strongest fortified places in France were to be occupied for five years by an army, to be commissioned by the Allies, of not to exceed 150,000 men, under the command-in-chief of an officer to be named by the allies, the pay, lodging, fuel, lighting, and equipment of this force to be paid by France. *Third*, France was required to keep up all the fortifications and military establishments occupied by the army of occupation, and to arm and provision them. *Fourth*, The different powers were to be indemnified for the spoiliations to which they were subjected during the revolution, amounting to 735,000,000 francs, and 100,000,000 francs were also to be paid to the smaller powers as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The whole sum France had to pay, besides supporting the army of occupation and repairing the fortresses, was

not less than fifteen hundred and thirty-five millions of francs.

The conditions of peace imposed upon France by the Allies on the occasion may be divided into three classes. *First*, An entire change in the form of government, and a restoration of a dynasty that had been expelled by revolution. *Second*, Indemnity for the expenses to which all the European States had been subjected by France, under the Revolutionary and Bonaparte governments, and also for the expenses of the war waged to overthrow him, and to obtain indemnity for the spoiliations perpetrated under his rule. *Third*, Security against both the martial and predatory spirit of the French people, and against the desire for revenge which their humiliation was expected to engender.

The first of these conditions was realized by the degradation and imprisonment of a sovereign whom the people of France had four times chosen, with comparative unanimity, to rule over them, and for whom, only four months previous, they had, with apparent alacrity, expelled the sovereign imposed upon them by the Allies. In their declaration at Vienna, on the 15th March, the Allies had even gone so far as to denounce Bonaparte as an outlaw, whom it would be no crime to assassinate, and who had laid himself open to public vengeance. The defeat at Waterloo left it in the power of the Allies to repudiate the popular interpretation put upon their declaration; but there is no doubt that that declaration would have been a good plea in bar to any criminal proceedings instituted against an assassin of Bonaparte.*

* It seems to have been seriously discussed by the Allied Sovereigns at one time whether Napoleon should not be put to death. He probably owed his life to the firmness of the Duke of Wellington, if we do not exaggerate the import of the following paragraph in one of his letters, dated June 28, 1815, to Sir Charles Stuart:—

"General Nommelin has been here this day to negotiate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered that I have no authority. The Parisians think the Jacobins will give him over to me, believing that I will save his life. Blücher writes to kill him; but I have told him that I shall remonstrate, and shall insist on his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so

The indemnity for their expenses required by the second class of conditions was both financial and territorial. Relatively, however, the proportion of territorial was far in excess of the financial indemnity. The third class of conditions, designed to furnish security against the predatory or vindictive spirit of the French, involved mainly the banishment of their great captain, reducing their territorial influence, and stripping them of important fortresses.

But this was not all. The Allies deemed it their duty to do what they could to dispel an illusion older than Bonapartism, that to France belongs a certain military and territorial supremacy in Europe, and that no administration or dynasty could allow itself any repose until that supremacy was established.

It was mainly to cure this "criminal and impotent delirium" that the Allies provided for the occupation of France with an army of 150,000 men for five years after the Restoration, and placed in command of it the distinguished soldier whose name is most conspicuously associated in history with Bonaparte's final discomfiture. This prolonged occupation of the territory of France was determined upon, not merely to insure the payment of the indemnities which fell due by annual installments, but to bring distinctly home to the minds of the people of France that they were not invincible, that they were not exempt from the vicissitudes of fortune, and that they were as liable as other nations to be punished for the abuse of transitory military successes. That to give France such a lesson, and to make it as impressive as possible, was a part of the well-defined policy of the Allies, is not entirely an inference from the rigorous discipline to which she was subjected, though of course such considerations do not find expression in treaties; nor are they apt to figure in the negotiations of diplomatists. It so happens, however, that this feeling frequently

reveals itself in the confidential correspondence of the statesmen of that period, from which it may be not uninteresting to furnish two or three illustrations.

In a note dated July 10, 1815, from Lord Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh, who represented England at the Congress of Vienna, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs thus expressed the sentiment of one of the Allies, and probably of all, on the subject:—

"The more I consider the present internal state of France, and the little chance there is of security for Europe, from the character and strength of the French government, the more I am satisfied that we must look for security in frontier, and in really weakening the power of France. This opinion is rapidly gaining ground in this country, and I think, even if Bonaparte were dead, there would now be considerable disappointment at any peace which left France as she was by the treaty of Paris, or even as she was before the revolution."

Only five days later the same minister writes to his representative in Vienna:—

"We shall never be forgiven if we leave France without securing a sufficient frontier for the protection of the adjoining countries. The prevailing idea in this country is, *that we are fairly entitled to avail ourselves of the present moment to take back from France the principal conquests of Louis XIV.* It is argued with much force that *France will never forgive the humiliation which she has already received, that she will take the first opportunity of endeavoring to redeem her military glory, and that it is our duty, therefore, to take advantage of the present moment to prevent the evil consequences which may even follow from the greatness of our success.* It might have been not unwise last year to try the effect of a more magnanimous policy, but in the result of that we have been completely disappointed, and we owe it to ourselves now to provide in the best manner we can for our own security."

Here it will be remarked that the principle of reclaiming the territory taken from Germany by Louis XIV., which Count Bismarck announces it to be the intention of his government to reannex, is distinctly recognized and justified.

Another authority, of perhaps greater weight than that we have cited, has placed the same views upon record, and under circumstances which, as they are not probably familiar to our readers, we will briefly recapitulate.

Shortly after the banishment of Bonaparte to St. Helena, representations were laid be-

foul a transaction—that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners—and that I was determined that, if the Sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, who should not be *me*" (sic).—*Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh*, vol. x., 387.

fore the ministers of the allied powers from the Pope, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of Holland, and other sovereigns, demanding the restoration of the statues, pictures, and other works of art, of which their respective States had been systematically stripped by the Bonaparte government. The King, though twice restored to his throne by the Allies, never had the manliness to propose to restore these trophies of national treachery and rapine. Lord Castlereagh was charged to bring the several complaints of the Allies, especially of the King of the Netherlands, to the notice of the allied ministers, which he did in a letter dated 11th September, 1815. In this communication Lord Castlereagh took the ground that these spoils tended to impede the moral conciliation between France and the countries she had invaded, and that "while they remained in Paris, constituting, as it were, the title-deeds of the countries which had been given up, the sentiments of reuniting these countries again to France will never be altogether extinct, nor will the genius of the French people ever completely associate itself with the more limited existence assigned to the nation under the Bourbons." "If," adds his Lordship, "the French people be desirous of treading back their steps, can they rationally desire to preserve this source of animosity between them and all other nations? If they are not, is it politic to flatter their vanity and to keep alive the hopes which the contemplation of these trophies are likely to excite?"

The Duke of Wellington, commander of the Allied forces in France, was charged with the duty of seeing that the spoils were restored to their legitimate proprietors. In an account which he gave of his proceedings to Viscount Castlereagh, dated 23d September, 1815, he says:—

"I accordingly spoke to the Prince de Talleyrand upon the subject; explained to him what had passed in conference, and the grounds I had for thinking that the King of the Netherlands had a right to the pictures, and begged him to state the case to the King, and to ask his majesty to do me the favor to point out the mode of effecting the object of the King of the Netherlands, which should be least offensive to his majesty. The Prince de Talleyrand promised me an answer on the following evening; which not having received, I

called upon him at night, and had another discussion with him upon the subject, in which he informed me that the King could give no order upon it; that I might act as I thought proper; and that I might communicate with Mr. Denon.

"I sent my *aide-de-camp*, Lieut.-Colonel Freemantle, to Monsieur Denon in the morning, who informed me that he had no orders to give any pictures out of the gallery, and that he could give none without the use of force.

"I then sent Colonel Freemantle to the Prince de Talleyrand to inform him of this answer, and to acquaint him that the troops would go the next morning at twelve o'clock to take possession of the King of the Netherlands' pictures; and to point out, that if any disturbance resulted from this measure, the King's ministers, and not I, were responsible. Colonel Freemantle likewise informed Monsieur Denon that this measure would be adopted.

"It was not necessary, however, to send the troops, as a Prussian guard had always remained in possession of the gallery, and the pictures were taken without the necessity of calling for those of the army under my command, excepting as a working party, to assist in taking them down and packing them."

When the treaty of Paris was signed by the Allies, on their first visit to Paris, in 1814, nothing was said about these trophies being restored. The Duke explains the omission in this wise, and it is in the extract we are about to make that the language occurs, to which the events of to-day give a new and important significance:—

"The conduct of the Allies regarding the museum, at the period of the treaty of Paris, might be fairly attributed to their desire to conciliate the French army, and to consolidate the reconciliation with Europe, which the army at that period manifested a disposition to effect. But the circumstances are now entirely different. The army disappointed the reasonable expectations of the world, and seized the earliest opportunity of rebelling against their Sovereign, and of giving their services to the common enemy of mankind, with a view to the revival of the disastrous period which had passed, and of the scenes of plunder which the world had made such gigantic efforts to get rid of.

"This army having been defeated by the armies of Europe, they have been disbanded by the united Council of the Sovereigns, and no reason can exist why the powers of Europe should do injustice to their own subjects, with a view to conciliate them again. Neither has it ever appeared to me to be necessary that the Allied Sovereigns should omit this opportunity to do justice, and to gratify their own subjects, in order to gratify the people of France. The feeling of the people of France upon this subject must be one

of national vanity only. It must be a desire to retain these specimens of the arts, not because Paris is the fittest depository for them—as, upon that subject, artists, connoisseurs, and all who have written upon it, agree that the whole ought to be removed to their ancient seat—but because they were obtained by military successes, of which they are the trophies. The same feelings which induce the people of France to wish to retain the pictures and statues of other nations would naturally induce other nations to wish, now that success is on their side, that the property should be returned to their rightful owners, and the Allied Sovereigns must feel a desire to gratify them.

"It is, besides, on many accounts desirable, as well for their own happiness as for that of the world, that the people of France, if they do not already feel that Europe is too strong for them, should be made sensible of it; and that whatever may be the extent, at any time, of their momentary and partial success against any one, or any number of Powers in Europe, the day of retribution must come.

"Not only, then, in my opinion would it be unjust in the Sovereigns to gratify the people of France on this subject at the expense of their own people, but the sacrifice they would make would be impolitic, as it would deprive them of the opportunity of giving the people of France a great moral lesson."

The Duke here charges the army of France with rebelling a second time against their Sovereign, and with giving their services to the common enemy of mankind, with the view to a revival of the scenes of plunder*

* Among Lord Castlereagh's papers, after his death, was found a list or summary of the contributions and exactions, of one sort and another, levied by France upon the other States of Europe, from the commencement of the Revolution to the Consulate. To show at what price to her neighbors, and by what felonious means she repaired her exhausted credit, decorated her cities and fortified her frontiers, intersected the empire with thousands of miles of roads and canals, we will recapitulate the aggregates of "loot" brought from each separate nationality. It reveals the essential character of modern Caesarism, which is but another name for highway robbery on a very large scale, better than volumes of history:—

SUMMARY.

Territory of Austria.....	1,450,250,000 francs.
" Prussia.....	7,000,000 "
" Holland.....	835,445,000 "
Territories between the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Rhine.....	111,280,000 "
Palatinate of the Rhine.....	12,462,000 "
Deux Ponts.....	4,455,000 "
Duchy of Berg.....	2,464,000 "
Swabia.....	24,248,418 "
".....	27,510,000 "
Territory of Milan.....	294,000,000 "
Heredit. States of the Emperor.....	10,100,000 "

which the world had made such gigantic efforts to get rid of, and therefore as unworthy of any further efforts at conciliation. He also charges the people of France with being animated by a spirit of vanity fatal to the peace of Europe; and advises that the favorable opportunity then offered of giving them a "good moral lesson" should by no means be neglected. The Duke was at this time the agent and military representative of the Allied Powers, and may therefore rightfully be said to have spoken their sentiments.

If the lesson administered by the Allies in 1814-15 were not sufficiently impressive; if, with all their remedies, they failed to reach the seat of the disease, it was certainly from no fault in their diagnosis, nor from any apparent want of vigor in their treatment.

From the recital which we have given of the final action of the Allied Powers in the great European crisis of 1814-15,—a crisis curiously on all fours with that through which Europe is now passing,—it will be apparent that the new conqueror of France is not likely to impose any conditions upon his defeated adversary for which the great powers have not furnished him ample authority and precedent. We will not attempt to conjecture the terms which King William will finally exact from France, but it is probable, and, for aught we can see, reasonable, that he should be indemnified for the expenses to which his government and people have been wantonly and

Estates of the Church.....	156,750,000 francs.
Switzerland.....	24,300,000 "
Bavaria.....	16,970,000 "
Raden.....	3,245,000 "
Sardinia.....	5,000,000,000 "
Modena.....	30,400,000 "
Lucca.....	5,000,000 "
Parma.....	3,850,000 "
Naples.....	7,150,000 "
Genoa.....	4,500,000 "
Tuscany.....	238,600,000 "
Rome.....	47,575,000 "
Venice.....	194,045,768 "
Spain.....	30,000,000 "
Portugal.....	30,000,000 "
Hamburg.....	7,000,000 "
Bremen and Lubeck.....	3,000,000 "
Grand total.....	9,126,684,581 "

Here are about 2000 millions of dollars which, says the report, had gone to France in good hard metal up to the peace of Campo Formio and the expedition to Egypt. Bonaparte, however, preyed upon Europe for fifteen years after that.

wickedly subjected ; that he should take such security as he can find against the repetition of the madness which the French nation is now expiating ; for let it be more distinctly understood than it seems to be, that Cæsarism is not Corsican but French ; and it may well be doubted whether the sentiment of French nationality had ever a more perfect expression than under the leadership of the two Napoleons. Sorely as these rulers offended the sentiments of a limited and most enlightened class, in a far greater measure they delighted the mass of the nation, and it is seriously questioned whether any sovereign will long reign in France who does not contrive in some way to gratify the national passion for what is there called "glory."

There are new elements at work now upon all European nations, which must sooner or later qualify their ambitions and change their aspirations. As wealth is increased and diffused, the power of every nation will pass

more and more into the hands of capitalists, who are more anxious about their investments than about glory. Before these influences, military prowess, hereditary rank, and many of the customary forms of greatness will gradually pale like ghosts before the dawning day. That epoch, though approaching, has not yet come for France. The obstinacy with which her rulers, past and present, refuse, in defiance of overwhelming disasters, to treat for peace upon terms involving loss of territory, proves this, and justifies Count Bismarck in assuming as he does that when France thinks herself strong enough to recover the territory taken from her by Germany, she will not fail to attempt it. In view of such a germinating threat, it is probable that the victorious belligerent will take such additional guarantees from France for the future repose of Europe as past experience has shown to be necessary, and for which the Great Powers in 1814-15 set him the example.